Indexicality, transparency, and mental files by Ball, Derek Nelson
Indexicality, Transparency, and Mental Files
Derek Ball
University of St Andrews
It would be easy to read Francois Recanati’sMental Files as a sustained de-
fence of the utility of a certainmetaphor: that themind is like a ﬁling cabinet,
and that ourmental representations are like ﬁle cards onwhich our beliefs are
written. But too much focus on the metaphor sells Recanati’s project short;
Recanati advances a number of challenging claims about mental represen-
tation, which, though phrased in terms of the ﬁle metaphor, are ultimately
independent of it. This paper aims to challenge two of these claims: that
mental representations are indexical, and that they are transparent. I begin by
explaining the role indexicality plays in Recanati’s system.
1 Mental Files and Indexicality
According to Recanati, beliefs are structured mental representations, and
some of their components are usefully thought of as being like ﬁles that
contain information. Recanati claims that each ﬁle is associated with an ac-
quaintance relation (which Recanati calls an epistemically rewarding (ER)
relation). The referent of the ﬁle is the object that stands in the relation to
the ﬁle. So, for example, some ﬁles – the  ﬁles – are associated with a
“relation which holds between a place and a mental ﬁle whenever the mental
ﬁle is tokened in the mind of a person who occupies the place and serves to
store information that person is in a position to gain in virtue of occupying
that place” (, p. ); others – the  ﬁles – are associated with a re-
lation that holds between a person and a ﬁle just in case the ﬁle is tokened
in the person’s mind and serves to store information that the person is in a
position to gain about herself in virtue of the fact that she is herself (,
p. ). Referring expressions in language inherit their reference from the
mental ﬁles with which they are associated (, p. xiii).
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Given this view of the reference-ﬁxing role of ER-relations, we can state
token-reﬂexive rules by which the referent of a ﬁle can be determined (,
pp. -). For example, the referent of a  ﬁle is the place that the
person who has tokened that ﬁle is in. Recanati regards these token-reﬂexive
relations as capturing what all ﬁles of a given type have in common. This is
the sense in which ﬁles are indexical (, pp. -).
On Recanati’s view, all ﬁles are indexical in this way – even those (like 
ﬁles, or stable ﬁles (the “encyclopedia entries” that correspond to names)) that
do not ordinarily shift their referents. There is a terminological issue here
about whether this is a useful way to use the word “indexical”, but let’s grant
Recanati his usage. It still seems clear that there is a theoretically interesting
difference between (say) names on the one hand, and words like “you” and
“that” (and, on Recanati’s view, their associated ﬁles) on the other. As a rough
ﬁrst shot, the token-reﬂexive rule for “you” and “that” will link tokens of these
terms will very often link different tokens to different referents, even if we
hold the speaker ﬁxed. Call terms and mental ﬁles that shift reference in this
way practically indexical.
On Recanati’s view, many mental ﬁles are not practically indexical. No-
table among these are the stable ﬁles. Stable ﬁles are linked to a higher-order
ER relation: the relation that holds between an object and a ﬁle just in case
some other ER relation holds between the object and the ﬁle. But, Reca-
nati claims, these rest on a base of ﬁles (or proto-ﬁles, which are based on a
particular ER relation, but (unlike full-ﬂedged ﬁles) can only contain infor-
mation obtained through that relation) that are closely linked to speciﬁc ER
relations. Recanati writes:
ﬁles at each of the levels I have described presuppose ﬁles at
the previous level. Proto-ﬁles are the most basic; conceptual
ﬁles are generated from them (through what I called ‘expan-
sion’). Among conceptual ﬁles, ﬁrst-order ﬁles are more ba-
sic, since higher-order ﬁles—encyclopedia entries—presuppose
them. (, p. )
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Since – with a few exceptions, such as the relation associated with the 
ﬁle – ER relations come and go, many or most of these more basic ﬁles will
be practically indexical. So Recanati endorses the following claim:
The Hierarchy Thesis Stable “encyclopedia entry” ﬁles can exist only if prac-
tically indexical ﬁles exist.
I said earlier that the referent of a mental ﬁle is the object that stands to
the ﬁle in the relation associated with the ﬁle. What happens if more than
one object stands in the relation to the ﬁle (or if different objects stand in the
relation to the ﬁle at different times?) On Recanati’s view, ﬁles are subject to
a norm of proper functioning:
The ER Norm A ﬁle should be maintained only if exactly one object stands
to it in its associated ER relation, and only for as long as the same object
stands in this relation.
In general, if this norm is not satisﬁed, the ﬁle fails to refer. So, for example,
if one has a  ﬁle, and one’s location changes, in order to satisfy the norm
one must remove the ﬁle (presumably copying the information contained in
it to a ﬁle of another type), or change the ﬁle into a ﬁle of another type. One
can then form another  ﬁle, which will refer to one’s new location.
The situation is somewhat more complicated with respect to stable ﬁles,
since these are associated with multiple ER relations. In the case where such
a ﬁle comes to bear different ER relations to different individuals, Recanati
claims that the referent is the dominant source of information in the ﬁle
(, p. ). Recanati leaves the notion of dominance largely intuitive,
but he does hold that dominance may shift depending on what information
in the ﬁle is most “strongly activated” by the purposes at hand (, p. ).
So in this sort of case, the referent of a stable ﬁle exhibits a sort of context-
sensitivity: it will refer to different individuals depending on what part of its
information is most relevant in a given situation. And if no single source of
information is dominant in a given situation, then the ﬁle fails to refer in that
situation.
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A system of mental ﬁles must be designed in such a way that it can obey
the ER Norm, at least in typical cases. I see two ways such a design could go.
Let me introduce them by discussing two ways one might design a computer
to store information about different times. Computer clocks depend on an
timer chip which sends a signal at a regular frequency (for example, on typical
PCs, . times per second). In typical computers, this signal advances a
counter. This counter represents the present time.
Now suppose that the computer with this sort of clock needed to gener-
ate ﬁles associated with different times. On Recanati’s picture, the system
should work like this: in addition to a series of stable ﬁles – the encyclope-
dia entries about times, or the names of times – it would have a buffer ﬁle
in which it collects information about the present moment. At each signal
from the timer chip, it would generate a new, stable ﬁle, copy the informa-
tion from the buffer into the stable ﬁle, and remove the information from
the buffer. The buffer ﬁle is naturally regarded as a sort of indexical – a 
ﬁle. Call a computer that works in this way a practical-indexicals-basic – or for
short indexicalspr-basic – system.
Surely there could be a system of this kind. But there is another way that a
computer could keep track of information about various times (without any
kind of  buffer). Recall that computers increment a counter at each
signal from the timer chip. A computer could be designed so that just after
each signal, it creates a new ﬁle, labeled with the value from the counter.
Information about the present time could be stored in the highest-valued
ﬁle; information about past times could be stored in relevant lower valued
ﬁles.
It is most natural to regard the ﬁles used by such a system as stable, ency-
clopedia entry-style ﬁles rather than as practically indexical ﬁles. A ﬁle might
be used just after it is created to store information about the present time;
but the ﬁle is retained even after a new, higher-valued ﬁle is created, and
even from the beginning it could have as the function of storing information
from any number of ER relations. So, at least to ﬁrst appearances, there does
not need to be anything practically indexical in such a computer’s represen-
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tation of time. In effect, a computer that worked in this way would have a
system for generating stable ﬁles that refer to times, along with a labeling
convention that enables the system to correctly store information about the
present time. Call a computer that works in this way a names-only system.
A names-only system could be extended to have something like temporal
indexicals. One way to do this would be to add a  buffer, much like the
indexicalspr-basic system. Then information about the present time could be
added simultaneously both to the  buffer and to the highest-valued sta-
ble ﬁle. This would create a hybrid system in which names and indexicals are
equally basic. It is hard to see what advantage would be gained by this du-
plication of effort. But there is a more interesting, and perhaps more useful,
possibility. For the sake of concreteness, imagine that the computer stores in-
formation about the weather. If a user enters temperature(T), where T is the
name of a time about which the computer has information stored – i.e., the
“label” of a stable ﬁle – the computer will return the temperature information
stored in that ﬁle. Now suppose the programmers want to add the possibility
of reporting on the present weather, with a command like temperature(now).
It seems clear that this can be done without adding a  ﬁle. Instead, the
computer should respond to temperature(now) with the temperature in the
highest-valued ﬁle. On this way of developing the system, there would be no
 ﬁle. Instead, now is acting as a pointer to whatever ﬁle happens to be
the highest valued.
So far, I have restricted my attention to representations of times. But
something similar seems possible for other sorts of representation. The cru-
cial mechanism is the numerical labeling of ﬁles, which enables the system
to select one ﬁle (the highest-valued) in a special way. In effect, the highest-
valued ﬁle at a given time will have a special functional role. But one could
imagine other means of giving ﬁles a special functional role. For example, a
computer equipped with a GPS device could create stable ﬁles labelled with
co-ordinates, and could store information about its present location in the ﬁle
whose label matched the output of the GPS device. And of course there are
means other than the ﬁle’s label; I see no reason why the subpersonal mech-
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Indexicalspr-basic System Names-only System
On each clock tick:
. Create a new stable, name-like
ﬁle.
. Copy the contents of the 
ﬁle into the new stable ﬁle.
. Erase the contents of the 
ﬁle.
On each clock tick:
. Create a new stable, name-like
ﬁle.
To add information about the present
time:
 Update  ﬁle.
To add information about the present
time:
 Update highest-valued stable
ﬁle.
Figure : Comparison of the Indexicalspr-basic system and the Names-only
system
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anisms that link a being’s perceptual input systems to ﬁles could not simply
output to a stable ﬁle, rather than (as Recanati would have it) ﬁrst routing
them through a perceptual demonstrative ﬁle.
What is the upshot of this discussion for Recanati’s views of mental ﬁles?
First, I want to claim that:
The Names Thesis A names-only system is possible.
The Names Thesis does not claim that names-only systems involve no indexi-
cality in Recanati’s sense of that term. But they involve no practical indexical-
ity – nothing that would ordinarily be thought of as context sensitivity. They
are thus counterexamples to the Hierarchy Thesis. So the truth of the Names
Thesis would undermine Recanati’s picture of stable ﬁles, with their higher-
order ER relations, as resting on a foundation of ﬁles based on ﬁrst-order ER
relations (many or most of which will be practically indexical).
Perhaps Recanati could give up this part of his picture. But the possibility
of a names-only system raises a more troubling possibility for him: that we are
names-only systems:
The Names Question Are we names-only systems?
A positive answer to the Names Question would undermine much of the in-
terest of Recanati’s view. If we are names-only systems, then we have only one
type of ﬁle – the type associated with a higher-order ER relation – so Reca-
nati’s views about the signiﬁcance of ER relations, indexicality, and so forth,
would be more or less irrelevant to us. So what evidence do we have for the
claim that we are not names-only systems?
Let me begin by setting one style of argument aside. Recanati frequently
appeals to John Perry’s view of mental ﬁles. Perry famously observed that
identity claims involving both names and indexicals are very often – perhaps
always – non-trivial and cognitively signiﬁcant. For example:
() That guy is Francois Recanati.
() It is now ten o’clock.
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() I am Derek Ball.
(In Recanati’s terms, such claims typically do not involve co-reference de jure.
See below for further discussion.) Does the non-trivial nature of such claims
show that the ﬁle associated with “That guy” is of a different type than the ﬁle
associated with “Francois Recanati”, or that the ﬁle associated with “now” is of
a different type than the ﬁle associated with “ten o’clock”? No. On Recanati’s
view, what is required for cognitive signiﬁcance and non-triviality is (at least
roughly) that the identity claim involve distinct token mental ﬁles. It does not
require that these be tokens of distinct ﬁle types. So the Perry examples do
not undermine the idea that all of our mental ﬁles are stable.
2 Conversion and Proper Function
I will return the Names Question below; ﬁrst, I want to examine a compli-
cation in Recanati’s account. Consider again the names-only system that I
described in the previous section. I claimed there that such ﬁles were from
the beginning stable, name-like ﬁles. But this could be denied. In particular,
on Recanati’s view, ﬁles can convert from one type to another (, p. ).
In such conversion the “pile” of information in the ﬁle stays the same, but the
ER relation associated with the ﬁle changes (, pp. -). Recanati could
claim that what I called the “names-only” system is really a system that (with
each tick of the clock) generates a new (practically) indexical  ﬁle, and
converts the previous  ﬁle into a stable ﬁle.
Recanati offers such an account in response to David Papineau’s ()
names-only description of a closely related case. When we see an object, Re-
canati claims, we are able to form a perceptual demonstrative ﬁle about that
object. When we are no longer in a position to perceive the object, we should
not retain a perceptual demonstrative ﬁle about it (since we will no longer
stand in the relevant perceptual ER relation to the object). But, Recanati
claims, we can convert this ﬁle into a memory demonstrative, which is based
on an ER relation of memory. We thereby retain the information stored in
the demonstrative ﬁle without violating the ER Norm.
I, T,  M F / 
Names-Only Description Indexicalpr-Conversion
Re-description
On each clock tick:
. Create a new stable, name-like
ﬁle.
On each clock tick:
. Convert  ﬁle into a stable,
name-like ﬁle.
. Create a new  ﬁle.
To add information about the present
time:
 Update highest-valued name-
like ﬁle.
To add information about the present
time:
 Update  ﬁle.
Figure : Ways of describing the (alleged) names-only system
In short, there are two ways we can describe a case like my (alleged)
names-only computer: in terms of stable ﬁles, or in terms of practically in-
dexical ﬁles and conversion. What is at stake between the two descriptions?
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the descriptions do not differ about the sources
from which the ﬁles can get information. On either story, the ﬁle can store
information from any ER relation. The difference is in the function that the
ﬁle is said to have. The indexicalpr re-description claims that a particular ER
relation is privileged: it is the relation that the ﬁle is based on, so that it is the
function of the ﬁle to store information gained by that relation. The names-
only description denies this; it claims that the function of the ﬁle is to store
information gained by any ER relation that the ﬁle stands in to a certain object.
Now it may seem that this difference has consequences that will put us in
a position to evaluate the two descriptions. Remember that violation of the
ER Norm results in reference failure; or in other words, a ﬁle fails to refer if it
fails to stand in the ER relation on which it is based to any object, or if it stands
in this relation to more than one object. So it may seem that the two ways of
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describing the scenario will have different consequences regarding when the
ﬁle will fail to refer. According to the names-only description, the ﬁle will fail
to refer if no object – or no single object – is the dominant source of the infor-
mation in it. According to the indexicalpr-conversion re-description, it fails
to refer before the conversion if it fails to stand in the relevant indexical rela-
tion to any object, or if stands in that relation to more than one object. (What
happens after the conversion will depend on what type of ﬁle it is converted
to; I’ll return to this issue shortly.)
Let’s set up a case to try to drive the predictions of the two descriptions
apart. (For the sake of simplicity, I’ll use Papineau’s perceptual demonstrative
case as a model, though similar cases could be developed for reference to
times.) I see a bird, and judge that it is grey. On the basis of my memory I
come to believe that last Tuesday, that bird was eating ﬁsh. In fact, the bird I
saw last Tuesday is not the bird I am now seeing. At the same time, a friend,
whom I presuppose to be watching the same bird, tells me that that is a fulmar.
In fact, she is watching a different bird. I combine the information obtained
from three ER-relations into the ﬁle that I opened when I saw the bird.
Now it is not entirely clear what the referent of the ﬁlemight be in this sort
of case. But there is some intuitive pull towards the claim that the referent
is the bird I see, and this is what the Indexicalpr-Conversion Re-description
would predict. So is the Names-Only description wrong? Only if the bird is
see is not the dominant source of information in the ﬁle. As long as the bird
I see is the dominant source of information in the ﬁle, then the Names-Only
story will also predict that it is the referent. And in general, cases in which
it is plausible that the ﬁle refers to the bird I see will be cases in which it is
plausible that the bird I see is the dominant source of information in the ﬁle.
So we need to develop a case in which the information that is dominant in
the situation is not derived from the bird I see. Suppose I infer: “That is a
fulmar. That ate ﬁsh. Therefore some fulmars eat ﬁsh.” Now I am not relying
on information gained perceptually from the bird I see; instead, I am relying
on the information about other birds gained throughmemory and testimony.
What is the referent of the ﬁle associated with “that” in my inference?
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Again, it is hard to determine; but – granting (as Recanati would insist) that
the inference is valid – there is some attraction to the thought that the ﬁle
associated with “that” fails to refer. So, victory for Names-Only? Not so fast.
The Indexicalprs-Conversion description can duplicate this result. The pro-
ponent of the Indexicalpr-Conversion story should claim that our feeling that
the ﬁle associated with “that” fails to refer shows that other ER-relations have
become essentially involved in the ﬁle’s functioning; that is, just before the
inference, the ﬁle has been converted from an indexicalpr ﬁle to a stable ﬁle.
In this case, the Indexicalpr-Conversion story will have exactly the same con-
sequences with respect to the reference of the ﬁle as the Names-Only story.
I want to draw two conclusions from this discussion:
. In cases where the Indexicalpr-Conversion story makes plausible pre-
dictions, the Names-Only story can duplicate them by appealing to the
notion of a dominant source of information.
. In cases where the Names-Only story makes plausible predictions, the
Indexicalpr-Conversion story can duplicate them by appealing to the
notion of conversion.
These conclusions entail that it is very difﬁcult to drive a wedge between the
predictions of the two descriptions of the case. This difﬁculty generalises:
it seems to me that almost any system could be described either in terms of
stable ﬁles and dominance, or in terms of practically indexical ﬁles and con-
version. But this entails that it is very difﬁcult to tell whether a given system
involves indexicalpr ﬁles or not. And in particular, it is hard to see what evi-
dence there could be for Recanati’s view that we are indexicalspr-basic systems
rather than Names-only systems. So it is hard to see how Recanati can assume
a negative answer to the Names Question.
One problem is that Recanati tells us relatively little about what conversion involves.
What does a mind have to do to convert one ﬁle type into another? How can one change the
function of a ﬁle? Perhaps further development of the notion of conversion would put us in
a better position to resolve this debate.
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3 Co-reference and Transparency
The considerations of the previous two sections do not show beyond a doubt
that there are no practically indexical ﬁles. But they do show that the phe-
nomena can be described using Recanati’s version of the ﬁle metaphor in a
way that falsiﬁes one of his main claims. In this section, I want to show that
Recanati faces a similar problem with respect to another of his main claims:
that sameness of mental ﬁles is transparent.
Recanati emphasises the importance of the phenomenon of de jure co-
reference. The paradigm case of de jure co-reference, according to Recanati,
is an anaphoric pronoun and its antecedent; for example, there is de jure
co-reference in a sentence like, “Ciceroi is bald and hei is fat”, but (in the
normal case) not in a sentence like, “Cicero is bald and Tully is fat”. Moreover,
Recanati claims, an analogous phenomenon can take place at the level of
thought, and this can be explained in terms of mental ﬁles: two pieces of
information are de jure co-referential if they “occur in the same ﬁle without
the beneﬁt of a prior judgement of identity or linking operation” (, p.
).
The distinction between de jure co-reference and non-de jure co-reference
corresponds closely to a distinction between inferences that (in Campbell’s
phrase) “trade on” or presuppose identity, and those that assert identity. For
example, it is natural to think that (ceteris paribus – Kripke puzzle cases and
the like aside) one may validly infer from () and () to () without relying
on further premises:
() Cicero is bald.
Recanati also offers the following account of the phenomenon: “The basic criterion
for de jure co-reference is, roughly, that anyone who wonders whether the two terms are co-
referential (instead of taking for granted that they are) is someone who does not fully under-
stand the utterance. In other words, de jure co-reference entails knowledge of co-reference
on the part of the competent language users” (, p. , footnote omitted). In my
view, Recanati’s characterisation of the phenomena in terms of a connection between un-
derstanding and knowledge should be rejected for Williamsonian (, ch. , , ch. )
reasons. But it seems clear that there is a useful distinction between cases of co-reference due
to anaphora on the one hand, and (say) co-reference between “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”
on the other, whatever the correct characterisation of that distinction ultimately may be.
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() Cicero is tall.
() Someone is tall and bald.
Indeed, the supposition that further premises asserting the identity of Cicero
and Cicero are required seems to land one in an inﬁnite regress. This con-
trasts with an inference from () and () to ():
() Tully is tall.
Such an inference seems (ceteris paribus) to require a further premise: that
Cicero is Tully. Recanati cashes the distinction between the two inferences
out in terms of de jure co-reference: in the ﬁrst inference, the occurrences of
“Cicero” in the two premises are de jure co-referential – the two occurrences
of “Cicero” are associated with the same ﬁle, or the information that Cicero
is bald and that Cicero is tall occur in the same ﬁle – while in the second
inference, the occurrence of “Cicero” in the ﬁrst premise is not de jure co-
referential with the occurrence of “Tully” in the second premise – the two
occurrences are associated with different ﬁles.
Recanati also endorses a closely related claim: that sameness of mental
ﬁle is transparent in the following sense:
The Transparency Thesis “If it seems to you that two tokens [i.e., token men-
tal representations, or token words as you are using them] ‘obviously
and uncontrovertibly’ mean the same, then they do mean the same
and co-refer (if they refer at all)” (Recanati (, pp. -), citing
Schroeter ()).
Recanati is not entirely explicit about how transparency is explained on his
system, but I take it that the idea is something like this. Part of what it is
for two pieces of information to be in the same mental ﬁle is that they be
taken to concern the same object (, p. ). So if you take two pieces
of information to concern the same object, that will make it the case that
the two pieces of information occur in the same mental ﬁle. So you cannot
“mistake one conceptual content for another” (Schroeter (, p. ),
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quoted in Recanati (, p. )); if you take two pieces of information to
be in the same ﬁle, they will be in the same ﬁle. Similarly, if you take it that two
terms “obviously and uncontrovertibly” mean the same and co-refer (as you
are using them), then this will make it the case that you are associating them
with the same ﬁle (and so they do co-refer, at least as you are using them).
Recanati mentions as potential problems for the transparency thesis what
he calls “inverse Paderewski cases” (, p. ): cases in which a thinker is
acquainted with two bearers of the same name, and does not realise that they
are distinct people. In such cases, Recanati claims, a thinker may have only
a single mental ﬁle, in which she (mistakenly) stores information about both
bearers of the name. This ﬁle, Recanati claims, fails to refer (at least in most
circumstances –setting aside situations in which one or the other source may
be dominant).
This description is plausible in simple cases. But the screw can be turned.
One mark of rationality is the ability to recognise our mistakes. We may be
accustomed to using a certain form of inference that we later come to regard
as invalid. For example, I might be accustomed to inferring from premises
of the form All Fs are G to conclusions of the form There is at least one
F; but upon reﬂection, I may become convinced that “all” in English is not
existentially committing, and so that these inferences are invalid (despite the
fact that they once seemed obviously valid to me). Consider the following
case (based on a true story):
Recognised Equivocation I judge:
() Barry Smith is a philosopher of mind and language who works
in London.
I then judge:
() Barry Smith is a ontologist who works in Buffalo.
I infer from these premises (and no others) that someone is a philoso-
pher of mind and language who works in Buffalo. It initially seems
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obvious to me that the inference as valid. (I suppose that the philoso-
pher in question must split his time between the two universities.) But
upon further reﬂection, I decide that no single person could have dis-
tinguished himself in two ﬁelds in this way. I judge that my informa-
tion must be about two distinct people who share the same name. I
conclude that my initial inference was invalid. I judge:
() Barry Smith is not an ontologist
(intending my use of “Barry Smith” to be de jure co-referential with the
ﬁrst premise of my initial inference). I then infer (from () and ())
that some philosopher of mind and language is not an ontologist. I
also judge:
() Barry Smith does not work in London
(intending my use of “Barry Smith” to be de jure co-referential with the
second premise of my initial inference). I infer (from () and ())
that some ontologist does not work in London.
To sum up the situation:
. At time t1, I make an inference that trades on the identity of the refer-
ent of “Barry Smith” in () and the referent of “Barry Smith” in ().
. At time t2, I make an inference that trades on the identity of the refer-
ent of “Barry Smith” in () and the referent of “Barry Smith” in (),
and another inference that trades on the identity of the referent of
“Barry Smith” in () and the referent of “Barry Smith” in (). I in-
tend that the occurrences of “Barry Smith” in () and () do not
co-refer, and I also deny that the occurrences in () and () co-refer.
The case produces two problems for Recanati’s view. The ﬁrst is that it
seems – at least by Recanati’s lights – that the occurrence of “Barry Smith” in
() is de jure co-referential to the occurrence in (), that the occurrence in
() is de jure co-referential to the occurrence in (), that the occurrence in
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() is de jure co-referential to the occurrence in (), but that the occurrence
in () is not de jure co-referential to the occurrence in (). That is, it seems
to be a case in which the transitivity of de jure co-reference fails, and (as I
will argue) fails in a way that is difﬁcult for Recanati to accommodate. The
second, and deeper, problem is that the case seems to be a counterexample
to transparency. At the time I begin the inference, it seems obvious that the
tokens of “Barry Smith” in () and () are co-referential. But I come to judge
that I wasmistaken, and that they in fact fail to co-refer. Bymy own lights, what
once seemed to be an obviously valid inference turned out not to be. Let me
consider each problem in turn.
Recanati gives an account of some related cases due to Angel Pinillos
(). Pinillos claims (and Recanati agrees (, p. )) that in the sen-
tence, “Wewere debating whether to investigate bothHesperus1 and Phosphorus2;
but when we got evidence of their true identity, we immediately sent probes
there1;2”, both “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are de jure co-referential with
“there”, but “Hesperus” is not de jure co-referential with “Phosphorus”. Reca-
nati agrees that the example shows that de jure co-reference is not transitive,
and that this entails that de jure co-reference cannot always be a matter of be-
ing associated with the same mental ﬁle. But Recanati claims that there is
an alternative account available to the mental ﬁle theorist. In cases of what
he calls “merging”, when one recognises that two distinct ﬁles refer to the
same object, one will create a third ﬁle, copy all of the information from the
initial ﬁles into the new ﬁle, and remove the initial ﬁles. Recanati describes
Pinillos’s sentence as involving a case of “partial merging”: upon recognising
the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus, one creates a new ﬁle, copies the
information from the two initial ﬁles into it, but – unlike in the case of full
merging – one does not remove the initial ﬁles (, p. ). This explains
the case, since ﬁles that partially merge are de jure co-referential to the ﬁle
that they merge into, while remaining not de jure co-referential to each other.
Recanati might attempt to describe the case of revealed equivocation in a
similar way. In this case, the process would involve a sort of reverse merger: a
branching. One would begin with a single ﬁle. Upon coming to believe that
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the information in the ﬁle originated frommore than one source, one would
form two ﬁles, and copy information from the initial ﬁle into the two new
ﬁles. This copying process might not be straightforward; one would have to
disentangle which bits of information one had obtained from which source
and put the information in the appropriate ﬁles accordingly (and perhaps
there will be some pieces of information that one will not be able to place in
either ﬁle, because one is not sure of their source.)
Now the analogue of Recanati’s partial merger strategy would be to appeal
to “partial branching”. In this sort of case, one would form two new ﬁles,
copying information as best one could, but would also retain the original ﬁle.
Cases of this sort seem possible. But they would not help Recanati defuse the
problem, since partial branching cannot result in co-reference in this sort of
case. By Recanati’s lights, the original ﬁle (as used in the inference described)
fails to refer, since no single object is the dominant source of the information
in it. But (barring any further problems) the two new ﬁles that result from
the branching should refer. So the new ﬁles cannot co-refer with the original
ﬁle.
Perhaps Recanati could add some operation on mental ﬁles to his arsenal
in order to preserve the idea that there is de jure co-reference in all the right
places in the case. But there remains the problem that the case poses for the
transparency thesis. In short, the problem is this. At the time of my initial
inference, I regarded the occurrences of “Barry Smith” in the two premises
as obviously co-referential. But after further reﬂection and reasoning (which
notably involves empirical information about what it is possible for one per-
son to accomplish), I come to decide that I was wrong. According to my later
judgement, what once seemed obvious turned out the be false; the two oc-
currences turned out not to be co-referential, and my inference turned out
to be invalid. But since the transparency thesis has it that “If it seems to you
that two tokens ‘obviously and uncontrovertibly’ mean the same, then they
do mean the same and co-refer (if they refer at all)” (, pp. -), it is a
consequence of the subject’s own judgement about the case that transparency
has failed in the ﬁrst inference.
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Recanati might try to argue that the subject’s judgment is mistaken. The
subject has correctly recognised that something has gone wrong with the in-
ference, he might claim, but the diagnosis is wrong: in fact, the occurrences
of “Barry Smith” are de jure co-referential, so that the inference is valid, but
they both fail to refer.
The problem with this response is that it ignores the inferences that fol-
low. After I judge that my initial inference was invalid, it seems obvious to
me obvious that the occurrences of “Barry Smith” in () and (), and in
() and (), are co-referential. Transparency entails that this seeming is ac-
curate. But again, it is hard to see how this is compatible (given Recanati’s
commitments) with (i) the claim that the occurrences of “Barry Smith” in
() and () fail to refer; and (ii) the extremely plausible claim that the oc-
currences of “Barry Smith” in () and () do not fail to refer. So it seems
that Recanati could only maintain transparency between () and () in this
way by letting transparency fail between () and () and between () and
().
Alternatively, Recanati might try to argue that the case is not one in which
the antecedent of the transparency principle is satisﬁed. After all, the an-
tecedent stipulates that the two tokens must seem obviously and incontrovert-
ibly to mean the same. But, Recanati might claim, in the present case, the
two occurrences could not incontrovertibly seem to mean the same, since the
appearance is quite quickly controverted. In effect, the suggestion would be
that if two tokens seem incontrovertibly the same to a person, the person will
not give up the idea that they are the same – at least not as a result of the sort
of reasoning sketched in this case, and perhaps not under any circumstances.
At this point, it is an empirical question whether there are any cases in
which two things seem “incontrovertibly” the same in the relevant sense. I
am sceptical. The suggestion seems to underestimate our power of rational
self-criticism. Quine, Putnam, Burge, Williamson, and others have made a
powerful case that we can gain grounds for rational doubt of even those be-
liefs that seem obvious and trivial. The same is true of transitions in thought.
Just as we can get evidence that our beliefs are false, we can get evidence
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that our inferences are invalid; and to the extent that we are rational, we will
respond to this evidence.
4 Conclusion
I have argued that Recanati’s commitment to the indexicality of mental repre-
sentation is not well-motivated, since his own theory allows for an apparently
equally good description of the phenomena purely in terms of stable ﬁles.
Moreover, I have shown that there are cases in which Recanati’s account of
co-reference de jure and transparency is difﬁcult to maintain.
Regardless of the fate of his claims about indexicality and co-reference,
Recanati has given us a number of subtle tools for describing mental rep-
resentations. Perhaps not every distinction he introduces corresponds to a
genuine difference. But there is no doubt that they should play a role in
shaping future debate.
References
Papineau, D. (). Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In Alter, T.
and Walter, S., editors, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New
Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, pages –. Oxford University
Press, New York.
Pinillos, A. (). Coreference and meaning. Philosophical Studies,
:–.
Recanati, F. (). Mental Files. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Schroeter, L. (). The illusion of transparency. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, :–.
Recanati writes, “a rational subject must be capable of reﬂecting critically upon his or her
own thoughts; that sort of reﬂexive control over one’s thoughts is possible only if they are
transparently accessible” (, p. ). I accept the premise. But on my view, this premise
supports exactly the opposite conclusion: if transparency is true, this limits our power to
reﬂect critically on our thoughts.
I, T,  M F / 
Williamson, T. (). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Williamson, T. (). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell, Oxford.
